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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
For more than five decades, the issue of capital structure still remains a 
puzzle. One of the issues is the lack of consensus to choose either debt or equity that 
would qualify as the optimal capital structure. The study investigated the 
determinants of capital structure by exploring traditional financial theories (trade-off 
theory and pecking order theory) and agency cost hypothesis. The study was 
conducted on Iranian firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 
2001 to 2010. A panel data set of 123 published annual reports of these firms was 
compiled. The data was used to analyse the impact of the financial and corporate 
governance factors on the debt and equity structure of these firms. Ordinary Least 
Squares, Fixed Effect and Generalized Method of Moments methodologies were 
used in the analysis. The results stated that capital structure is positively related to 
tax rate, size, capital intensity, and risk, but negatively related to profit, growth and 
tangibility. As for the agency cost, government ownership has positive impacts on 
capital, indicating that these firms are exposed to financial distress with increasing 
debt. In contrast, capital structure is negatively related to the legal person ownership, 
ownership concentration of the single largest shareholder and the ten largest 
shareholders, indicating that these firms are able to manage their debts and future 
prospects. The effects of agency cost on capital structure shown in the study serve as 
the evidence of agency conflicts based on debt and equity explanations. In addition, 
the findings of this study predicted the financial and non-financial factors of capital 
structure. The study has contributed to the field of finance by identifying capital 
structure determinants, and provided valuable insights on optimizing capital structure 
among the Iranian firms which would provide information for investors as well as 
other stakeholders. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
 
Selama lebih daripada lima dekad isu struktur modal masih kekal menjadi 
persoalan. Salah satu isu ialah kurangnya kesepakatan untuk memilih sama ada hutang 
atau ekuiti sesuai sebagai struktur modal optimum. Kajian ini mengkaji penentu struktur 
modal dengan meneroka teori kewangan tradisional (trade-off theory dan pecking order 
theory) dan hipotesis kos agensi. Kajian dilakukan ke atas firma-firma Iran yang 
tersenaraikan di Bursa Saham Teheran bagi tempoh 2001-2010. Satu set data panel bagi 
123 laporan tahunan yang diterbitkan oleh firma-firma berkenaan telah dikumpulkan. 
Data digunakan untuk menganalisis kesan kewangan dan faktor pentadbiran korporat ke 
atas struktur hutang dan ekuiti firma-firma ini. Kaedah Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed 
Effect dan Generalized Method of Moments telah digunakan dalam penganalisisan data. 
Keputusan kajian menunjukkan bahawa struktur modal mempunyai hubungan yang 
positif dengan kadar cukai, saiz, intensiti modal dan risiko tetapi mempunyai hubungan 
yang negatif dengan keuntungan, pertumbuhan dan tangibiliti. Bagi kos agensi, 
pemilikan kerajaan mempunyai kesan positif ke atas modal. Ini menunjukkan bahawa 
firma-firma berkenaan terdedah kepada kesulitan kewangan dengan peningkatan hutang. 
Sebaliknya, struktur modal mempunyai hubungan negatif dengan pemilikan 
perseorangan yang sah, penumpuan pemilikan pemegang saham tunggal terbesar dan 
sepuluh pemegang saham terbesar yang menunjukkan bahawa firma-firma ini mampu 
menguruskan hutang dan prospek masa depan mereka. Kesan kos agensi ke atas struktur 
modal yang ditunjukkan dalam kajian ini menjadi bukti konflik agensi berdasarkan 
penjelasan hutang dan ekuiti. Di samping itu, hasil kajian ini meramalkan faktor 
kewangan dan faktor bukan kewangan dalam struktur modal. Kajian ini telah 
memberikan sumbangan kepada bidang kewangan dengan mengenal pasti penentu 
struktur modal dan menyediakan pandangan yang berharga mengenai mengoptimumkan 
struktur modal dalam kalangan firma-firma mampu memberikan maklumat kepada para 
pelabur dan pihak berkepentingan yang lain. 
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CHAPTER    1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1   General Overview 
Capital structure refers to a combination of debt and equity but giving priority 
over each other in a financial decision of a firm to invest in pursuit of maximizing 
value of the firm and its shareholders wealth. The financial decision of capital 
structure is not only  concerned with finding the right kind of finance, but is also 
concerned with choosing the best overall mixture of these funding options for 
commencement and running the operations of business. Therefore, the financial 
decision is considered to have occupying an important role in financial management 
to formulate the capital structure of the firms, affecting its overall operations, growth 
and value. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) initially asserted that the value of firm is 
entirely independent of its capital structure under perfect capital markets; therefore, 
debt and equity finance can substitute perfectly for each other. Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) later found that the presence of taxes and information asymmetry lead to the 
choice of capital structure and significantly affect the value of the firm. Accordingly, 
the choice of capital structure waxes and wanes the value of companies. A right 
choice builds an optimal capital structure that maximizes their value. 
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The study on the determinants of capital structure is necessary to provide 
companies in making an optimal choice between debt and equity to achieve the 
maximum value of firms. Albeit, there have been many studies on the determinants 
since second half of the 20th century; however, their findings are still ambiguous and 
difficult to interpret (Barclay and Smith, 2005). Most of the studies refer to  the 
context of developed countries, such as the United States (e.g., Bradley et al., 1984; 
Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Friend and Lang; 1988; Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Chaplinsky and Niehaus, 1993), Western Europe (e.g., Cole, 2007; Qian et al., 
2007), United Kingdom (e.g., Bevan and Danbolt, 2002), Germany and France (e.g., 
Antoniou et al., 2002), and European SMEs (e.g., Hall et al., 2004). Some studies 
(e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995) have compared the companies of developed 
countries with one another, such as between G7 countries (the group of seven 
countries is a working coalition of the world’s largest economies) except Canada and 
Italy (Wald, 1999) and the United States and Japanese manufacturing corporations 
(Kester; 1986).  
Recent studies have been carried out in the context of developing countries 
such as Thailand (Booth et al., 2001), Malaysia (Pandey, 2001), China (Chen, 2004), 
Jordan (Omet and Nobanee, 2001), and Saudi Arabia (Al-Sakran, 2001), and the like, 
Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, India and South Korea. Some other 
studies, such as Deesomsak et al. (2004), used cross-country comparisons based on a 
particular region, the Asia Pacific. Although these studies provided similar evidence 
for the financial decision making, the evidence appeared to be insufficient to explain 
how companies from developing countries finance their assets (Barclay and Smith, 
2005). 
The studies from both developed and developing countries have reached a 
consensus that growth and development of a firm depend significantly on its sources 
of financial capital, which are crucial for a firm to access it. Financial capital and its 
accessibility is one of the main research areas in both developed and developing 
market economy (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Swanson et al., 2003). Therefore, the 
context of firms from a country, such as Iran, engaging in a market economy, has 
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been the area of this research to investigate the decision of financial capital structure 
of firms in the country. 
1.2   Background of Study 
Since 1950, when Durand (1952) and Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
propounded first theories of capital structure, the issue of capital structure still 
remains a puzzle (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Swanson et al., 2003; Lim, 2012; Umar et 
al., 2012). Durand’s “relevance theory” proposed that capital structure affects the 
value of firms and companies because of the impact of relative different costs of debt 
and equity have on the weighted average cost of capital. In contrast, Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1958) “irrelevance theory” suggested that capital structure does not affect 
the value of firms under perfect market conditions because it is the return to assets 
rather than the costs of capital that determines the value of the firms. Thus, studies on 
the capital structure evolved around two kinds of rational approaches, financial and 
corporate governance. The financial approach laid the foundation of “trade-off 
theory” with regard to Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevance theory. Trade-off theory 
considers some conditions of imperfect market and explains that firms determine 
their optimal capital structure by finding the balance between benefits of debt and 
costs of debt. The theory of trade-off mainly takes under consideration how capital 
structure is affected by corporate tax (Modigliani and Miller, 1963); personal tax 
(Miller, 1977); non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) and bankruptcy 
costs (Baron, 1974; Warner, 1977).  
 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) contended that firms that apply trade-off 
model compare the cost and benefits of debt financing, thus, predict their optimal 
debt levels, particularly when marginal present value of interest tax shield is equal to 
the marginal present value of the costs of financial distress. Moreover, where the 
marginal costs and benefits of each additional unit of financing are optimal, the form 
of financing, such as equating these marginal costs and benefits could be determined 
(Tong and Green, 2005). 
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A different perspective from Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory is the 
“signalling models” that considers the impact of information asymmetry on capital 
structure. Myers and Majluf (1984) regarded debt or equity as a signal of information 
to markets and developed the “pecking order theory”. This theory asserts that firms 
and companies often finance their investments in the order of using retained 
earnings, debt and then equity due to asymmetric information in different financial 
funding instruments, such as debt funding versus equity funding and internal funding 
versus external funding.  
One of the aspects of pecking order theory predicts that profitable firms 
usually prefer internal financing rather than taking up new debts or equity, even 
though debt would be cheaper than equity within certain proportions. Fama and 
Fench (2002) found that comparing to non-profitable firms, profitable firms were 
less levered. On the other hand, because of information asymmetry, large firms tend 
to accumulate debts so as to support and keep up with the payments of dividends, 
while small firms tend to have the opposite behaviour (Murray and Goyal, 2003).  
While, corporate governance approach refers to the issue of how debt and 
equity are treated as part of a corporate governance mechanism (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the “agency cost theory” to 
relate the principal-agent problem of corporate governance to capital structure.  
Agency cost theory examines how the capital structure is affected by agency debt 
costs arising from the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors, and the 
agency equity costs arising from the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers. Ang et al. (2000) and Fleming et al. (2005) showed that the conflict 
between outside equity holders and owner-manager which generated agency costs 
could be reduced by increasing the owner-managers’ proportion in equity (i.e., 
agency costs vary inversely with the manager’s ownership). However, a reduction of 
the cost due to the conflicts between equity holders and debt holders would be more 
complicated. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that there should be an optimal 
capital structure under which the lowest agency costs of a firm can be deduced from 
an independent variable such as size, profitability and growth. The locus of agency 
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costs which is equal to agency costs of outside equity and the ones of debt would be 
a convex curve, suggesting that agency costs should not be monotonic any more. 
In general, the theories of capital structure determinants mentioned 
previously are developed from studies carried out in the context of Western market 
economies (Chittenden et al., 1996; Hall et al., 2000, 2004). In another words, most 
studies on capital structure has been conducted in developed countries (Al-Najjar, 
2011). However, study on capital structure need to be tested in developing countries 
(Al-Najjar, 2011; Ba-Abbad and Ahmad-Zaluki, 2012). However, less work has been 
done in number to provide compelling evidence and information about developing 
countries, particularly Iran.  
Iran, as a developing country, has a transitional market economy. The 
economic environment of developing countries is very different from the developed 
countries (Bas et al., 2009); the latter have lower amount of long-term debt, while the 
adverse is true for the former (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Due to the 
information asymmetry, developing countries have higher long term debt (Dragotã 
and Semenescu, 2004). Notwithstanding the difference, capital structure 
determinants of firms or debt ratios seem to be affected by the same significant ways 
and types of variables, such as tax, size, profitability and growth, in both developing 
and developed countries, but there are some differences in financial decision making 
on debt or equity choice in developing countries (Mayer, 1990). However, there are 
differences in terms of institutional factors affecting the capital structure, such as 
growth, profit and tax rates (Bagherzadeh, 2003). Such differences raise the question 
of how determinants of capital structure work in a transitional economy of a 
developing country market economy (Chen, 2004), such as Iran (IMF, 2010; World 
Bank, 2011). This study, therefore, attempted to bring a more specific focus by 
situating an examination of capital structure in the context of listed companies in 
Iran. In order to provide a much broader perspective on the determinants of capital 
structure of Iranian listed companies, this research has applied multi-disciplinary 
theories, trade-off and pecking order to address institutional factors as well as agency 
cost to refer to corporate governance factors. 
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1.3 The Iranian Institutional Context 
The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) was incorporated in 1967 with six listed 
companies and experienced three different periods of time. First from 1967 to 1978, 
the number of listed companies increased from six to 105 companies. During this 
period, TSE experienced a good period of time in terms of investment in stock 
exchange and both companies and investors were attracted to shares trading. 
Secondly, from 1978 to 1988, TSE in this period of time was severely affected by 
two major events, the Islamic revolution and Iran-Iraq war. In this time dramatically 
the value and number of exiting companies reduced. Thirdly, 1988 to 2010, the 
Tehran stock exchange in this period was full of ups and downs. Since 1988, the 
private sector and most companies have been controlled by government and the 
number of companies listed on the stock exchange did not significantly increase or 
decrease. From 2001 onwards, the proposed implementation of Article 44 relating to 
the transfer of companies to the private sectors thus the number of companies listed 
in TSE increased. During 2001 to 2004 the TSE return on investment increased and 
reached up to 131.4 percent in 2003 while it experienced a very difficult situation in 
2007. The number of listed companies increased from 56 in 1988 to 422 in 2006 and 
then reduced to 341 in 2010.  
According to the article 44 of  the Constitution of Iran, the economy of Iran 
consists of three sectors, namely the state, the cooperative, and the private sectors. 
Accordingly, the growth and development of Iranian firms are strongly related to 
their organizational sector, economical state and governmental system. In addition, 
the capital structures of Iranian companies are also determined by the sectors and 
their financial factors or financial decisions to invest.  
Before the Islamic revolution, the economic development of Iran was rapidly 
achieving a significant economic modernization and industrialization. However, this 
rapid growth dropped down significantly by 1978 and led to capital flight in the 
range of 30 billion to 40 billion US dollars by 1980 (Hakimzadeh, 2009). By the end 
of the 20th century, Iran’s economy faced many obstacles, such as market forces, 
global financial crisis, and international sanctions (Gheissari, 2009).  
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Notwithstanding the international sanctions relating to nuclear program of 
Iranian government as well as the global financial crisis in 2008, the value of Iranian 
companies has kept the growth (Fassihi, 2010) on its moderate stage (Central Bank 
of Iran, 2010). According to International Monetary Fund report of 2010 and World 
Bank statistics of 2011, Iran’s economy was the eighteenth largest economy in the 
world with regard to purchasing power parity. This economy is changing from a 
centrally planned to a free market with a large public sector along with an estimated 
of 50 percent of the economy. According to the Economic report of 2009, the annual 
growth rate of industrial production in Iranian companies was ranked 39th in 2008. 
This growth rate has leapt to 28th place out of 69th place from 2008 to 2009 (Tehran 
Times, 2010). The financial factors, such as growth, profit and tax rates 
(Bagherzadeh, 2003) made differences in a data set of capital structure decision in 
comparison with developed countries.  
Over the past three decades, an increasingly changing market-oriented 
corporate sector has driven growth in the Iranian economy; the factors, financial 
policies, capital structures, institutions, managerial behavior and knowledge, 
determining the ‘nature’ of the Iranian firm have evolved (Bagherzadeh, 2003; 
Kimiyagari and Aynali, 2008). This change in business and ownership structures 
gives rise to know the relationships between debt levels and the financial and non-
financial factors determining the Iranian firms’ financial decision. 
Until recently, findings derived from analysed data set of developing 
countries have not been found. A few studies on transition countries of Middle East 
such as Iran have recently been published (e.g., Janbaz, 2010; Shahjahanpour et al., 
2010; Kimiyagari and Aynali, 2008; Kordestani and Najafi-Omran, 2008; 
Bagherzadeh, 2003). However, the approaches, methods, time periods, and analyzed 
capital structure variables applied in the studies provide scanty information on how 
the Iranian firms make debt and equity choice. In order to overcome the issue of 
inadequacy of information, this study has applied more relevant theoretical and 
empirical approaches and methods with a wide range of the time period and the 
variables to examine the possible determinant factors of the capital structure of 
Iranian companies. 
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The limited information on the capital structure of Iranian companies gives 
rise to  inadequacy in describing the country’s capital structure; it only attempts to 
determine a set of explanatory factors (i.e. liquidity, effective tax rate, payout ratio, 
non-debt tax shield and uniqueness) affecting the choice of capital structure. Studies 
on the country context, such as Shahjahanpour et al. (2010), Kordestani and Najafi-
Omran (2008) and Bagherzadeh (2003), used secondary data obtained from the 
financial statements of Tehran stock exchange listed corporations. These studies 
showed that decisions on capital structure of Iranian companies were likely tending 
to the content of the pecking order theory as compared to the trade-off theory. 
Several other studies such as Kimiyagari and Aynali (2008) and Janbaz 
(2010) used secondary data obtained from balance sheets, income statements, and 
cash flow ratios of Iranian firms including databases of secure electronic and 
governmental database. Kimiyagari and Aynali’s study consisted of 78 Iranian 
corporations; listed in TSE for the duration of 2001-2005 the study determined the 
effect of profitability, asset tangibility, growth, firm size, tax provision, and risk on 
capital structure of Iranian companies. While, Janbaz’s (2010) study consisted of 70 
Iranian corporations, existed in TSE for the duration of 2006-2007, the study 
examines the effect of profitability, asset tangibility, growth, firm size, tax provision, 
and liquidity on the capital structure. Their findings indicated that that both pecking 
order and trade off theories could predict the decision on capital structure of Iranian 
corporations, although the pecking order theory has better predictions. 
Although the government has taken some steps to make marginal 
improvements in the last four decades, corporate governance in Iran has not yet to be 
well developed. An outstanding step is the establishment of the TSE in early 1967. 
Following, in April 1968, some amendments have been made to the Iranian Trade 
Law with regard to the process of instituting and controlling firms. Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999) asserted that the modern concept of corporate governance has not 
recognized since the government has not sought to improve the competitive position 
of Iranian companies in the world’s capital markets in an attempt to attract foreign 
investment.  
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Until recently, the Iranian government has made significant efforts to expand 
the capital market by controlling the majority of businesses in Iran. However, the 
recent policies have been aimed at increasing the number of external control 
mechanisms in place.  For instance, the third and the fourth economic development 
plans, have placed a great deal of importance on the privatization of governmental 
organizations. Such actions indicate an interest in enhancing the current system to 
include external governance structures. Nevertheless, Iranian firms currently have 
weak internal and external corporate governance compared to companies in more 
industrialized countries (Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2008). 
 The studies on the Iranian context such as Kimiyagari and Aynali (2008), 
Kordestani and Najafi-Omran (2008), Bagherzadeh (2003), Janbaz (2010) and 
Shahjahanpour et al. (2010), cover short period of time to predict persuasively the 
determinant factors of capital structure of Iranian firms. On the contrary, this study 
has involved a longer period of transaction to predict considerable determinant 
factors of capital structure of Iranian firms. The research has also aimed at bringing a 
more specific focus by examining capital structure in the context of listed companies 
in Iran. There are many differences in business operations, ownership structures, 
capital structure decisions, and reporting systems between listed and non-listed 
companies. The added advantage of data from the group of listed companies is that 
they use international accounting standards and are subject to relatively strict 
information disclosure requirements. They have received a similar degree of 
autonomy in their business operations. They also should be well-performing 
financially and tend to be large in size and have gone through the same process of 
incorporation required by the government. 
Finally, capital structures of Iranian companies are influenced at least by two 
main different factors from firm’s capital structure in developed countries. Firstly, 
the bond market in Iran is at an initial step of development and, in fact, there is no 
considerable corporate bond market. In 2003, the companies on TSE were allowed to 
issue corporate bonds, which were called as participation paper whichever short term 
bonds between 1 to 3 years of fixed income instruments. In comparison to developed 
countries, Iranian financial market, especially the bond market is less developed and 
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this limits debt financing mostly to bank loan. Secondly, in Iran, most economic 
activity directly or indirectly, is controlled by government which may affect firm 
capital structure. 
1.4  Problem Statement 
One of the main corporate finance decisions is a firm’s capital structure 
decision that how a firm’s assets and operations are financed through some 
combination of debt or equity. The decisions are reflected and explained by a firm’s 
level of debt and equity. In a capital market with several inadequacies, such as taxes, 
agency costs and bankruptcy costs, many corporate finance theories propose that 
capital structure decisions are relevant since they can affect firms’ value and 
shareholders’ wealth. These theories, such as the trade-off theory, the pecking order 
theory and the agency theory are advanced to explain firm’s capital structure. 
However, according to Myer (2001), each theory works under its own assumption 
and propositions, hence, none of the theories can give a complete picture of the 
practice of capital structure. Debt is one of the main types or sources of financing 
which is an amount of money borrowed by one party from another. Debt is used as 
method for making large purchases of some companies and as a part of their overall 
corporate finance strategy for many corporations and individuals. Therefore, money 
will be given under the condition that it is to be paid back at a later date, usually with 
interest.  
As previously mentioned, there are several theories explaining the advantages 
and disadvantages of using debt. Trade-off theory considers some conditions of 
imperfect market and explains that firms determine their optimal capital structure by 
finding the balance between benefits of debt and costs of debt. Accordingly, firms 
select optimal capital structure by comparing the tax benefits of the debt and the 
costs of bankruptcy, that is to say the disciplinary role of debt and the fact that debt 
suffers less from informational costs than outside equity. Thus, optimal leverage 
minimizes cost of capital and maximizes firm value (Al-Shubiri, 2010). According to 
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pecking order theory, profitable firms and companies often prefer internal financing 
rather than taking up new debts or equity, although debt would be cheaper than 
equity within certain proportions. Another theory is the agency cost theory of capital 
structure. Agency costs arise as a result of the relationship between shareholders and 
managers and those between debt-holders and shareholders. The agency cost theory 
states that an optimal capital structure will be determined by minimizing the costs 
arising from conflicts between the parties involved. 
Due to the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital 
structure, it is pertinent to examine the effect of financial and corporate governance 
factors on firm’s financial decisions. Several such studies were conducted in 
European countries and in United States. According to Al-Najjar (2011), most 
studies on capital structure have been conducted in developed countries. Examples of 
these studies conducted on the UK companies are Antoniou et al. (2002), Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002), Muradoğlu and Sivaprasad (2012), while European companies, 
particularly France and Germany, are studied by Antoniou et al. (2002), Kouki and 
Said (2012) and, Hall et al. (2004) and Hernádi and Ormos (2012). Some other 
studies such as Akhtar (2005) concerned with Australian companies, while Akhtar 
and Oliver (2009) worked on Japanese firms. However, findings of these studies 
need to be tested in developing countries as well (Al-Najjar, 2011; Ba-Abbad and 
Ahmad-Zaluki, 2012).  
Similar empirical studies have recently been undertaken in an effort to apply 
the capital structure theories and the findings related to developed marked economy 
to the context of developing and transitional economies (e.g. Awan et al., 2011; 
Bauer, 2004). To the best knowledge of the researchers less work have so far been 
done in the context of developing countries. Examples of scarce studies on the 
context of Chinese firms are Chen (2004) and Seelanatha (2010) and Lim (2012), on 
Malaysian firms by Pandey (2001), on Saudi Arabian companies by Al-Sakran 
(2001), on Jordanian firms by Omet and Nobanee (2001), on Pakistani context by 
Qureshi (2009) and Awan et al. (2011), and on the context of Turkey by Parlak 
(2010). Only a few countries specific peer-reviewed studies can be seen in this 
regard (Booth et al., 2001; Bessler et al., 2011). However, the studies are limited in 
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number to provide compelling evidence and information about developing countries, 
particularly Iran. 
Literature on capital structure determinants of Iranian listed companies is 
very sparse. To cast some light on the recurring issue, Shahjahanpour et al. (2010) 
and Kimiyagari and Aynali (2008) suggested further studies on the context of Iranian 
firms. So far, the studies on the Iranian context cover only short period to predict 
persuasively the determinants of capital structure. This ultimately provides scanty 
evidence and information on the institutional and corporate governance determinants 
of capital structure of the Iranian companies.  
The limited information on capital structure determinants of the companies 
gives rise to inadequacy in describing capital structure determinants of Iranian firms, 
their financial decisions between debt and equity. The literature only provide a set of 
explanatory factors (i.e. liquidity, effective tax rate, payout ratio, non-debt tax shield 
and uniqueness) affecting the choice of capital structure. Due to the lack of adequate 
information and the inefficiency in the administrative system of tax collection, many 
of the profitable jobs commensurate with their income taxes fled, and, thus, part of 
government revenue got lost. Some of the tax collection rules offer tax breaks for 
companies, industries, and specific activities under certain conditions. Companies 
whose stock are accepted, by the Subscription Board for Transaction in Stock 
Exchange, shall be exempted from payment of 10% of the applicable tax, provided 
that all transfers of shares shall be made through the commission agents of the Stock 
Exchange and that such transfers shall be duly registered in the relevant books 
(Article 143 of T.A). 
Being in developing markets, Iranian firms are often exposed to different 
financial risks like bankruptcy, manipulation of resources, agency conflicts due the 
lack of stakeholders’ protection or poor corporate governance (Asadi et al., 2011). 
Some of the companies are heavily loaded by family, institutional, and even single 
shareholders, which expose the corporate risk to more corporate governance issues as 
the corporate financial policies are influenced by ownership structure in developed 
and developing countries (Asadi et al., 2011; Sinaee et al., 2011). The literature 
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provides a limited background of studies regarding corporate governance issues in 
case of Iran. Corporate governance in Iran has yet to be explored extensively.  
By controlling the majority of businesses in Iran, the Iranian government has 
made significant efforts to expand the capital market. However, the recent policies 
have been aimed at increasing the number of external control mechanisms in place. 
In other words, the third and the fourth economic development plans have placed a 
great deal of importance on the privatization of governmental organizations. Such 
actions indicate an interest in enhancing the current system to include external 
governance structures. However, Iranian firms currently have weaker internal and 
external corporate governance compared to companies in more industrialized 
countries (Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2008). Furthermore, in Iran, there is no 
considerable corporate bond market because the bond market is on the initial step of 
development. The companies on TSE in 2003 were allowed to issue corporate bonds, 
which are called as participation paper consists of short term bonds between 1 to 3 
years of fixed income instruments. The Iranian bond market compared to developed 
countries is less developed and this limits debt financing to mostly bank loans. 
According to IMF (2011), Iranian banking system is unique in that all 
banking activities must follow principles of Islamic Sharia. Moreover, Islamic 
banking in Iran is regulated by the 1983 law on interest and free banking, whereas 
other countries hosting Islamic banking are calling on a regulatory level to introduce 
provisions for specific requirements of Shari’a, especially the prohibition of interest. 
TSE is developing plans for listing sukuk (Sukuk is the Arabic name for financial 
certificates, but commonly refers to the Islamic equivalent of bonds). Since fixed 
income, interest bearing bonds are not permitted in Islam, Sukuk securities are 
structured to comply with the Islamic law and its investment principles, which 
prohibits the charging or paying of interest. Financial assets that comply with the 
Islamic law can be classified in accordance with their tradability and non-tradability 
in the secondary markets, a market which has not yet developed in Iran, as it has in 
Malaysia and GCC countries (IMF, 2011). In addition, government in Iran provides 
cheap loans for industries and entrepreneurs to stimulate investment, support 
emergence of new SMEs.  
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However, the insufficient evidence for capital structure determinants of 
Iranian firms leads to an unclear issue as to whether Iranian firms prioritize debt over 
equity or vice versa to finance their assets. The lack of evidence in turn gives rise to 
vital challenges in making financial decisions, prioritizing debt or equity, with 
respect to the effect of capital sources and their accessibility. The decision on debt or 
equity determines the growth and development of a firm (Harris and Raviv, 1991; 
Swanson et al., 2003).  
This study brought some novelty by involving institutional factors (i.e. tax, 
profit, firm size, firm growth, tangibility, capital intensity, and risk) and corporate 
governance factors (i.e. legal person ownership, government ownership, and largest 
shareholders) together to investigate extensively about how capital structure effects 
the Iranian companies in order to provide ample evidence and information. 
Furthermore, this study applied longer period of transaction to examine the 
determinants of capital structure, because longer period data might give a better 
insight into the results. Thus, this study could be considered a pioneer in detailed 
examination of the determinants of capital structure of Iranian firms, as preliminary 
groundwork for prospective researches. 
1.5   Research Questions 
This study has addressed the following research questions (RQ): 
RQ 1: What are the determinant factors of capital structure in Iranian listed 
companies?  
RQ 2: What is the impact of financial factors on capital structure? 
RQ 3: What is the impact of corporate governance factors on capital structure? 
RQ 4: Which variables among financial factors and corporate governance factors 
have consistency with capital structure theories?   
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1.6 Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine the financial and corporate 
governance factors underlying capital structure of Iranian non-financial industry 
listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange during the years of 2001 to 2010.  
1.7 Objectives of Study 
The following research objectives (RO) referred to a period of change and 
transition between 2001 and 2010 of Iranian firms, examining those determinants of 
financial and corporate governance factors.  
RO 1: To identify determinants of capital structure of Iranian listed companies. 
RO 2: To investigate the impact of financial factors on capital structure. 
RO 3: To investigate the impact of corporate governance factors on capital structure. 
RO 4: To identify the financial variables and corporate governance variables which 
are consistent with the capital structure theories.  
1.8   Scope of Study 
This study has investigated the factors determining capital structure of 123 
listed non-financial Iranian companies in Tehran Stock Exchange between 2001 and 
2010. The variables for this study includes financial variables i.e. tax, profitability, 
size, growth, tangibility, capital intensity and risk as well as corporate governance 
variables, i.e. government ownership, legal person ownership, single largest 
shareholder and ten largest shareholders. The selected time period was after the year 
2000 when the Iranian parliament passed more comprehensive and advance 
Securities Act than the previous one to develop an efficient and transparent securities 
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market (Tehran Stock Exchange, 2008). The Act, hereby, rendered the possibility of 
the study to collect an advanced data set that presents the development of financial 
instruments of the companies.  
1.9 Significance of Study 
This study has intended to make the following new contributions: 
Generally, the studies either conducted on the capital structure of developed 
country have used a single theoretical approach that confines the findings to a narrow 
perspective. By contrast, this study has referred to multi-disciplinary theories (trade-
off theory, pecking order theory and agency cost theory), so as to examine the 
determinants of capital structure, thereby contributing to broadening the perspective 
on prospective findings. The study has applied trade-off and pecking order theories 
as basic framework, and then incorporated the agency cost theory including the 
corporate governance factors into the study in order to use both financial and 
corporate governance factors, so that their possible impacts on capital structure of 
Iranian listed companies are determined.  
Most studies of developing countries have applied capital structure theories 
(i.e. trade off theory, pecking order theory and agency cost theory) without closely 
examining them when applied to the institutional context. As well as most studies in 
Iran also have applied capital structure theories without closely examining the 
relevance or irrelevance of these theories. Thus, this study attempts to examine the 
Iranian institutional context and discuss the impact of Iranian institutional factors that 
may affect capital structure. It therefore contributes to enhancing the empirical value 
of studying capital structure in the case of Iranian listed companies. 
As for corporate governance in Iran, Ghorbani and Zavareh (2013) argued 
that the main majority of the stockholders of the Iranian companies is government 
and the institutional investors are governed by the governmental sector which is lack 
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of management capability and efficiency. Furthermore, the firms with major foreign 
investors in Iranian firms are rare. Usually, private sector is not supported by the 
government, and is under heavy regulations (Ghorbani and Zavareh, 2013). 
According to Shlifer and Vishney (1997), ownership is one of the important 
determinants of corporate governance. Corporate governance in Iran has not yet to be 
well developed. Iranian government controlled the majority of businesses in Iran, 
either directly or indirectly and has made significant efforts to expand the capital 
market. Its actions indicate an interest in enhancing the current system to include 
external governance structures. There are very limited empirical evidences that 
explored the institutional ownership as a determinant of capital structure in Iran 
(Kimiyagari and Aynali, 2008).  Keeping in views the lack of effort in this context, 
this study has examined the Iranian institutional context and discussed the impact of 
Iranian institutional factors that may affect capital structure. It therefore would 
contribute by enhancing corporate governance issue as determinant of capital 
structure in the case of Iranian listed companies. 
Iranian banking activities must follow principles of Islamic Sharia (IMF, 
2011). Moreover, Islamic banking in Iran is regulated by the 1983 law on interest 
and free banking. Therefore, Tehran Stock Exchange is developing plans for listing 
sukuk (Sukuk is the Arabic name for financial certificates, but commonly refers to 
the Islamic equivalent of bonds). This unique system might affect to choose the 
optimal capital structure of Iranian listed firms. Hence, this study contributes by 
involving financial and corporate governance factors on how Iranian listed firms are 
choosing debt or equity.  
From a practical point of view, the result of this study provides high quality 
information, particularly on capital structure to the management in terms of decision 
making regarding the choice between debt and equity. Effective and efficient 
decisions result in the reduction of costs and thereby maximize shareholder wealth. 
In addition, findings of this study make available information for banking 
institutions. Furthermore, the banking institutions are better able to make decisions 
with knowledge about financial situation of firms in terms of lending and reduce the 
default risk. Besides, the result of this study would be of help for future researchers, 
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market practitioners and industries listed in Tehran stock exchange to improve the 
performance of companies which can ultimately lead towards the economic growth 
and development of Iran.  
1.10 Definition of Important Terms 
 Debt to Equity Ratio - A measurement of a company's financial leverage. It 
indicates relative proportion of shareholder’s equity and debt the company is 
using to finance its assets. 
 Debt to Total Assets Ratio - A measurement for a company’s financial 
leverage. It shows how much of the company's assets have been financed by 
debt. This ratio examines the percent of the company that is financed by debt. 
 Tax Rate - The tax rate is the tax imposed by the government and some states 
based on an individual's taxable income or a corporation's earnings. In addition, 
tax rate is the percentage of a corporation’s earning that is owed to the state, 
federal and in some cases, municipal governments. This study used the 
dividing of tax amount to profit before tax for measurement of tax rate.  
 Profitability - Profitability is the quality of affording gain or benefit or profit. 
In this study profitability is measured by net profit divided by total asset.  
 Firm Size - Firm size data provide a count of firms and their size. We measure 
firm size by the log of total assets. 
 Asset Tangibility - Asset tangibility is assets that have a physical form. 
Tangible assets include fixed assets, such as machinery, buildings and land. In 
this study asset tangibility is measured by fixed assets to total assets.  
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 Growth - Increasing and development from a lower to a higher or more 
complex form. An increase, as in size, number or value. For measuring growth, 
this study used log of total revenue.  
 Capital Intensity - In this study capital intensity is measured by dividing total 
assets to total revenue. This ratio is a formula that calculates how much money 
a company will need in order to support a certain level of sales. 
 Risk - Risk is the probability that an actual return on an investment will be 
lower than the expected return. This study used standard deviation of return on 
equity for measurement of risk. 
 Government Ownership - Shares owned by the government are ‘government 
shares’. For the measurement of government ownership, this study used the 
percentage of government shares in total shares. It shows the shares of 
government in a company. 
 Legal Person Ownership - Shares owned by institutions and firms’ legal 
persons are ‘legal person shares’. This study used the percentage of legal 
person shares in total shares for the measurement which indicates the legal 
person’s shares in a company.   
 Largest Shareholder - Shares owned by single largest shareholder in firms are 
largest shareholder. For the measure of the single largest shareholder this study 
used the percentage of shares by the largest shareholder in total shares, 
indicating the largest shareholder’s share in a company.  
 Ten Largest Shareholders - Shares owned by ten largest shareholders in firms 
are ten largest shareholders. For measurement of ten largest shareholders, this 
study used the percentage of shares by the ten largest shareholders in total 
shares. It shows the ten largest shareholders’ share in a company. 
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1.11   Structure of Thesis 
The thesis consists of five chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) introduces the 
thesis and describes the research background, objectives, questions, purpose, scope, 
potential contribution to knowledge, and limitation. 
Chapter 2 reviews, compares, analysis, discusses, and summarizes the studies 
which have been carried out previously and also studied recently on determinants of 
capital structure with an emphasis on the two areas of capital structure theories: 
corporate finance and corporate governance. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology and defines the hypotheses, thereby 
explaining how they are estimated and also how the framework is designed. This 
chapter develops two frameworks in line with three sets of theoretical hypotheses 
and their relevance for the Iranian institutional context is being discussed. The 
chapter describes how statistical models, as ordinary least square (OLS), fixed effect 
model and generalized method of moments (GMM) are designed to test theoretical 
hypotheses of capital structure. 
As for the Chapter 4, it reports on the empirical findings of the models tested. 
The chapter presents the results of OLS, fixed effect and GMM analyzed in between 
two statistical models using two dependent variables in one market. This chapter 
aims to identify the determinants of capital structure of Iranian listed companies. 
Finally, the Chapter 5 discusses the statistical results, whereby it outlines the 
contributions that this research makes to the study of capital structure in the case of 
Iranian listed companies. Thereafter, it discusses some limitations to the research and 
makes some suggestions for future study. 
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One conclusion that may be gleaned is that the capital structure is related to 
the level of profit, beside that capital structure variation depends on different factors 
such as corporate governance and information asymmetry in financial markets.  
In his original work on capital structure, Durand (1952) argued that capital 
structure influences the value of firms, although Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
disputed this conclusion for a set of restrictive assumptions about markets and 
imperfections. It is interesting to conjecture in the Iranian context, that this research 
has investigated the effect of capital structure on the value of Iranian listed 
companies. In real world markets, capital structure can influence firms’ value 
through its impact on risk, profitability and dividends, and the growth potential of a 
business. It is expected that a firm’s value might be maximized among the Iranian 
listed companies because of the higher debt ratio. At the same time, if the gearing 
was perceived as a significant risk, then this might negatively affect the firms’ value. 
However, the research suggests this risk could be moderated adequately by the use of 
corporate governance factors. 
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